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Children of Two Logics: A Way Into Canadian Constitutional Culture 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
 
 Canada was not founded on a vision of universal truth or of 
fundamental human rights.  There was no moment of rupture from the 
rule of law that inaugurated a project of ideal state creation, no 
constitutional moment of popular coalescence around metaphysical ideals 
that would underwrite the country’s life.  France and the United States, 
constitutional traditions that have dominated so much of constitutional 
theory, can hold out such statements of universal truth as the imaginary 
foundation of their republics.  The French Revolution, and the republic 
that it yielded, had beating at its heart the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen, articulating natural rights of a universal nature that would 
beat at the heart of a new constitutional culture.  The U.S. Declaration of 
Independence began not with a statement about the form of government 
sought, or a catalogue of injustices, but with an ontological claim: “We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”  It is this 
statement of universal truth that animated the revolution and informed 
the constitutional tradition to which it would give birth.   
Not so in Canada.  Canada came about through slow evolution: the 
Treaty of Paris, local treaties between Indigenous peoples and colonial 
representatives, a Royal Proclamation, followed by acts of Imperial 
Parliament, inching towards experiments in responsible government and, 
ultimately, Confederation and its first constitution in 1867.  To the student 
of Canadian history, the development of the Canadian constitution is a 
source of inexhaustible interest.  Yet it is a story of relationships, of 
political compromises, of conventions and meetings navigating local 
interests in an effort at a reasonably workable and effective system of 
government north of the 49th parallel.  “A reasonably workable and 
effective system of government”… a far cry from the Bill of Rights and the 
French Declaration.  Rich though the details of this early phase in Canadian 
constitutional history may be, it is not the stuff of novels or movies; it 
captures the interest of the local historian, not the imagination of the 
world.   
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Yet it would be quite wrong to say that Canada’s constitutional 
origins, and the constitution that was crafted in 1867, lacked inspiring 
vision or noble object.  The ring of its ambition simply did not carry in the 
same way as the French or the model of revolutionary state formation to 
the south.  The ambition was expressed in what would fairly be called a 
mundane set of provisions establishing branches of government, dividing 
powers, providing for schools and tenure for judges.  There was no Bill of 
Rights or formalized statement of political ideals.  Of course Canada 
would receive its modern declaration of rights, the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,1 in 1982, with its guarantees of rights and fundamental freedoms 
bringing Canada into the global family of polities organized around 
abstract universals.  With the Charter there would be no lack of high-
sounding language and aspirational statements.  But what could be said of 
the Canadian constitutional project pre-Charter, before this desiderata of 
rights and freedoms that echoed the core of international law, developing 
European constitutionalism, and the heart of the great constitutional 
projects of modernity? 
Well before the addition of the Charter to the Canadian 
constitutional landscape, the great Canadian constitutional scholar F.R. 
Scott could say the following of the project of constitutionalism in Canada: 
 
…a constitution confronts a society with the most important 
choices, for in the constitution will be found the 
philosophical principles and rules which largely determine 
the relations of the individual and of cultural groups to one 
another and to the state.  If human rights and harmonious 
relations between cultures are forms of the beautiful, then 
the state is a work of art that is never finished.  Law thus 
takes its place, in its theory and practice, among man’s 
highest and most creative activities.2 
 
There is much in Scott’s statement.  Constitutionalism is about 
harmonious relations between cultures, not just the relationship of state 
and citizen.  It is about the relationship of groups to one another, not 
solely or even primarily about the individual. Prior to the Charter, the 
aspiration, nobility and beauty of Canadian constitutional project lay in 
the particular.  The heart of the Canadian constitutional project was the 
logic of compromise, relativism, and local interest, negotiated into 
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workable configurations that bound communities together.  The vision lay 
in the nobility in making government work in this place given local 
conditions and the specific interests of given communities.  Canadian 
constitutionalism was an exercise in the logic of the particular; it was 
consummately political.   
 Today, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms sits at the forefront of 
Canadian constitutional imagination.  The British North America Act (now 
the Constitution Act, 1867),3 with its political arrangements and 
expressions of contingent history, remains crucial to the life of the country 
but the culture of Canadian constitutionalism has shifted.  The Charter’s 
protections of universal human rights and freedoms based in a modern 
metaphysics of state and citizen has migrated to the centre of public 
consciousness about what Canadian constitutionalism entails.  This is the 
Canadian constitution that resonates with the Bill of Rights, with the 
achievements of revolution, with the universal declarations that now set 
the path for the profoundly anti-political project of European 
constitutionalism.4  It is a constitutionalism in which the all-purpose 
reason of proportionality balancing is the lodestar of good governance just 
as it is across the Western world.5  And, as such, it is a constitutionalism 
that allows for – perhaps demands – comparison with and sampling from 
other similar constitutional orders.  If all are expressions of a reasonable 
response to a set of universal claims about the human, the migration of 
constitutional ideas seems inexorable.6  This constitutionalism is an 
exercise in the logic of the universal; it is concept-governed and the ideal 
of modern legality.   
 One cannot appreciate Canadian constitutionalism without 
recognizing that this second, powerful logic has never eclipsed the first.  
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To understand Canadian constitutional culture, at both a structural level 
and also in the finer strokes surrounding given issues, one must 
appreciate that Canadians are children of two constitutional logics – that 
of the local, the particular, and of harmonious relations between diverse 
communities through political compromise; and that of the metaphysical, 
the universal, and of a faith in the reason of legal principle.  These logics 
are not pure forms of some sort but, rather, imaginative formations about 
the nature of government, community, and authority that pull on one 
another at all points.  It would be wrong to imagine that doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers are bereft of universal ideals or that a 
bill of rights is detached from the politics of the particular.  At a deep 
level, federalism gives expression to ideals of democracy, of self-
determination, and (as the Scott quotation makes plain) inter-cultural 
justice.  And, like most bills of rights, the Canadian Charter was the 
product of local, historical debate and compromise and remains a site for 
these more political battles.7  Yet each has a dominant inflection – an 
orientation – that maps onto the two logics that I have identified.  
Contemporary Canadian constitutional culture is revealed in the story of 
navigating between these two logics at certain key points, tacking back 
and forth between the two, often confronting the tensions arising from 
fidelity to two visions of what constitutions are really for and finding a 
way to live with the resulting paradoxes.  This is the central claim of this 
piece: that tracking the abiding relationship between these two logics of 
constitutionalism is crucial to understanding the nature of Canadian 
constitutional culture. 
 In this piece I will look at three areas of modern Canadian 
constitutional life in which one finds the play of these two constitutional 
logics.  I will look to cultural and religious difference; judicial review; and 
issues of Indigenous rights, title and government as points at which one 
finds the imprint of these competing logics, and where it becomes clear 
that it is precisely at such points that one gets a line of sight into Canadian 
constitutional culture.  When we find that the particular resists annexation 
by the logic of the universal we have our hands on something important.  
Here the particular is expressing something essential about constitutional 
identity, about what defines this community as one that asks for affection 
rather than assent.  At such points the obdurate force of “what is 
reasonable” pauses at the threshold of a claim about “who we are”.  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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 My purpose is to illuminate something generally unnoted but 
essential in the culture of Canadian constitutionalism and so my focus is 
on the Canadian case.  Nevertheless, I would venture that although 
Canadian constitutional life might serve as a particularly potent instance 
of this dynamic, what I am exposing is a general predicament of modern 
constitutionalism and what I am suggesting is of broader methodological 
import in the study of constitutional cultures.  Even in those polities in 
which the universal and philosophical drove the state from its inception, 
that older – ancient – sense of a constitution as a political device fitted to 
working out local problems among particular interests in a given place is 
never too far absent.  Modern constitutions are beholden to two ideals: 
first, that if well enough crafted, they should be largely transportable to 
any other polity as an expression of universal truths of the just relation 
between state and citizen; and, second, that constitutions are stabilized 
political solutions to the exigencies of the particular, responsive and 
faithful to local truths and contingent realities.  The insistent trend of 
modern constitutionalism is towards the universal.  Yet the points at 
which the march of the logic of universal reason meets resistance in the 
particular are key junctures for understanding a country’s constitutional 
culture.  They are points at which the political, which sits at the heart of 
every constitution, no matter how modern and committed to universal 
reason, shines through.  It is here that one finds the matters that define a 
polity as a polity, rather than a geographically defined administrative unit 
giving better or worse articulation to principles of reasonable government.  
At these points – where what seems reasonable finds a limit in who we are 
– we have a conduit into constitutional culture.   
 
The Claims of Diversity 
 
 The realities of state formation in Canada were such that 
Confederation would require the coming together of two smaller maritime 
colonies, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, along with two large 
populations – an English Protestant population in what would become 
Ontario, and a large French Catholic population in Quebec.  
Constitutional scholars and historians frequently refer to confederation as 
a “compact” or the constitutional “compromise” between French and 
English Canada.  Canadian constitutional history prior to Confederation 
in 1867 was inaugurated by the Treaty of Paris, resolving hostilities 
between the British and French Crowns and ceding French interests in 
North America to the British.  Constitutional development at this early 
stage involved a series of subsequent acts of the Imperial Parliament (such 
as the Quebec Act) attempting to manage the on-the-ground realities of 
creating a country out of these “two solitudes”.  Given the practical need 
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to secure the acceptance, if not garner the loyalty, of the large French 
population in British North America in the wake of the American 
Revolution and the fact of an emerging and ambitious republic to the 
south, these early constitutional documents involved concessions, 
compromises, and guarantees aimed at the protection and satisfaction of 
French Catholic rights.  The British had won the war against the French 
but working out the local complexities of governance was a much more 
complicated task.   
 The British North America Act, now the Constitution Act, 1867, bears 
the imprint of this local history.  Among the most important provisions in 
this vein is s. 93, which guaranteed government-funded (French) Catholic 
schooling in English Canada and (English) Protestant schooling within 
French Canada.  Section 93 is not much studied in contemporary first year 
constitutional law courses but this fact belies its historical significance.  
Section 93 was among the most important provisions leading to 
Confederation.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada 
would look back at s. 93 and characterize it as “part of a solemn pact 
resulting from the bargaining which made Confederation possible”.8  The 
Court explained that  
 
The protection of minority religious rights was a major 
preoccupation during the negotiations leading to 
Confederation because of the perceived danger of leaving 
the religious minorities in both Canada East and Canada 
West at the mercy of overwhelming majorities.9 
 
The importance of this provision to the creation of the country could not 
be over-emphasized: “Without this ‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal term’ of 
Union, there would have been no Confederation”.10  Far from an 
institutional separation between church and state, the assurance of state 
support for religious education was an essential ingredient of Canadian 
constitutional life.   
 After the introduction of the Charter this arrangement would be 
subject to serious – and eminently reasonable – constitutional scrutiny.  
When, in the mid-1980s, the Ontario government sought to enact 
legislation that would provide for full funding of Roman Catholic separate 
high schools in Ontario, consistent with its obligations under s. 93, non-
Catholic families objected that similar support was not extended to other 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
8 Reference Re Bill 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 at 1173. 
9 Ibid at 1173. 
10 Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 at para. 29. 
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separate denominational schools.  The Charter now prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of religion in s. 15(1) and barred state 
endorsement of religion by virtue of “freedom of religion” in s. 2(a).11  The 
Charter seemed to expressly preclude precisely the kind of special 
arrangement found in s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  There was a deep 
awkwardness around affirming special privileges for Roman Catholics in 
Ontario and the recently enacted constitutional commitment to the equal 
treatment of religions.  The Supreme Court held, however, that s. 93, 
“which represented a fundamental part of the Confederation 
compromise”12 was simply immune from Charter scrutiny.   
 The principle that the Charter cannot be used to attack another part 
of the constitution was confirmed and amplified in the second challenge 
to these religious education arrangements, the case of Adler.13  Here the 
Charter claim was slightly different.  A group of Jewish parents and a 
group of non-Catholic Christian parents sought the expansion of the 
funding regime – equal funding of their schools, the litigants argued, 
would protect their religious freedom in the same manner as Roman 
Catholic education protected Catholicism in the Province of Ontario.  The 
majority of the Supreme Court admitted that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 
1867, served “to entrench constitutionally a special status for such classes 
of persons, granting them rights which are denied to others.”14  Yet when 
attention shifted to whether this offended the guarantee of freedom of 
religion, the Court again answered with an emphatic “no.”  Justice 
Iacobucci’s reasoning is telling: “As a child born of historical exigency, s. 
93 does not represent a guarantee of fundamental freedoms”15 but, rather, 
was “the product of an historical compromise which was a crucial step 
along the road leading to Confederation.”16  This status immunized it from 
the Charter; the principles of freedom of religion and the equal treatment 
of religions simply did not apply.  
 One sees, here, a constitutional system caught between two 
competing logics.  Canada would not have existed but for this historical 
compromise – a key function of the Constitution Act, 1867.  Section 93 was 
a manifestation of constitutionalism as a response to local exigency, 
historical particularity, and the political interests of communities.  This is 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
11 R. v Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
12 Ibid at 1197-98. 
13 Supra note 10. 
14 Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 at para. 25. 
15 Ibid at para. 30. 
16 Ibid at para. 29. 
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the historical heartland of Canadian constitutionalism.  Yet those who 
challenged this arrangement were correct; this historical compact could 
not be squared neatly with a principled, abstract commitment to religious 
freedom and equality.  The point is wonderfully underscored by another 
case brought in the same year as Adler, but this time to the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee.17  Mr. Arieh Hollis Waldman, the father of two Jewish 
children enrolled in a private day school in Ontario, argued that Ontario’s 
policy of funding separate Roman Catholic Schools violated religious 
freedom and equality guarantees found in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  The tribunal took account of the reasoning in 
the Bill C-30 case and the Adler decision, noting the special constitutional 
status of Roman Catholic education reflected in s. 93 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867.  The Committee reasoned as follows:  
 
In the instant case, the distinction was made in 1867 to 
protect the Roman Catholics in Ontario.  The material before 
the Committee does not show that members of the Roman 
Catholic community or any identifiable section of that 
community are now in a disadvantaged position compared 
to those members of the Jewish Community that wish to 
secure the education of their children in religious schools.  
Accordingly, the Committee rejects the State party’s 
argument that the preferential treatment of Roman Catholic 
schools is nondiscriminatory because of its Constitutional 
obligation.18 
 
The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations found Canada in 
violation of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  “[T]he fact that a distinction is enshrined in the Constitution,” the 
Committee explained, “does not render it reasonable and objective.”19  Of 
course it doesn’t.   
It is no answer to the demand for equal treatment by Jews to 
explain that they are not Catholic or Protestant, which is what the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s answer boils down to.  Many claims of 
historical privilege have given way to the rights-based logic of equal 
treatment, including instances in which novel constitutional interpretation 
was required to make it so.  Indeed, the case that gave Canada its central 
constitutional metaphor – the constitution as “living tree” – is one such 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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19 Ibid. 
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example, a case in which the force of equality dictated an interpretation of 
the constitution that would make women and men equally eligible to 
serve on the Senate.20  So the key question is why this particular survives 
when others succumb to the logic of the universal?  The answer is about 
constituting narratives and constitutional identity.  The Catholic schooling 
question participates in one of the grand narratives of Canadian self-
understanding.  The story of Canada as built on two foundational 
cultures, the English and the French, has been basic to Canadian self-
understanding and the question of Catholic and Protestant schooling, 
particularly Catholic schooling in Ontario, is a kind of synecdoche for this 
larger narrative.  The U.N. Human Rights Committee is not bound to this 
story in any way, owes this narrative no fidelity or care.  Yet when these 
cases were decided, the same could not be said for the Supreme Court of 
Canada, whose role in part is to reflect the constitutional identity of the 
country.  No matter how potent the logic of the universal, this was one 
event horizon past which reason alone could not see.  This particular 
survived the force of the universal because it stood for something 
fundamental about the identity of Canadian political community.  It may 
not always be so.  As multiculturalism and cultural diversity deepens, 
political identity may shift and the borders around this particular might 
weaken; in fact, today we see the privilege afforded to Catholic schooling 
in Ontario subject to renewed debate.  But a change in the answer to this 
constitutional question will signal a change in the basic narratives of the 
constitutional culture, not a sudden realization of the wisdom of the 
universal.  While Canadian constitutional life aspires to the modern logic 
of constitutions as expressions of legal reason and objective 
proportionality, Canadian constitutionalism is also bound to the 
particulars that make it the distinctive political arrangement that it is.  
 Paul Kahn has written that the ethical challenge of multiculturalism 
is precisely the difficulty of holding together our commitments to the 
universal and the particular.21  He explains that, when met with deep 
difference, we worry that a hands-off relativism will lead us into moral 
cowardice whereas the assertion of universal standards draws us into a 
kind of colonialism.  This ethical tension is also woven right into the 
constitutional fabric in Canada.  The multicultural constitutional history of 
the country, as well as Canada’s official state policy of multiculturalism, 
speaks to a political reality that is no less a part of Canadian constitutional 
culture than the language of universal human rights found in the Charter.  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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And so when met with the prospect of Islamic arbitration in Canada,22 the 
debate reflects the demand for universal standards that will ensure gender 
equality but we are also cognizant of the need to recognize, as we have in 
other contexts, the importance of having room for legal pluralism and the 
demands of diversity.  Hearing certain pleas for the active integration of 
immigrants and minorities into Quebec culture,23 we heed the call of two 
logics of constitutionalism – the need to protect and respect a distinct 
French geo-political identity that lies at the bedrock of our constitutional 
politics and the universal principle of freedom of religion that makes 
coerced integration anathema.  The unrelenting direction of modern 
constitutionalism is towards the logic of universalism, of reason-based 
standards that bind all equally.  Yet this is one key point at which 
Canadian constitutionalism gives space to the force of the particular, 
stalling this march of the universal.  This is the deeper significance of the 
association of Canada with a unique concern with multiculturalism and 
explains the overwhelming theoretical concern of Canadian constitutional 
thought with issues of multiculturalism and cultural difference.  In 
identifying this point of resistance to universalism, one finds an insistent 
claim about “who we are” and, with this, an important dimension of 




 The claim of this paper has been that to understand contemporary 
Canadian constitutional culture, one has to grasp that Canadians are 
children of two distinct constitutional logics, the logic of the particular 
and that of the universal.  When one finds points at which the local and 
particular are impervious to the logic of the universal, we have our hands 
on something crucial to constitutional identity and culture.  Debates 
regarding judicial review are another expression of this – an example of a 
prominent aspect of modern Canadian constitutional life that one cannot 
really understand absent an appreciation of the play of these logics. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
22 NATASHA BAKHT, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking at the Gates of Ontario: The 
Religious Arbitration Controversy -- Another Perspective, 40th Anniv. Ed. Ottawa L. Rev. 67,  
(2006);ANVER EMON, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurisprudence, and 
Multicultural Accommodation, 87 Canadian Bar Review 391,  (2009);SHERENE RAZAK, The 
'Sharia law debate' in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction in Legal Efforts to 
Protect Women from Culture, 15 Feminist Legal Studies 3,  (2007). 
23 See, e.g., GÉRARD BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR, Building the future, a time for 
reconciliation: report   (Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d'accomodement reliées aux 
différences culturelles. 2008). 
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 The introduction of the Charter in 1982 inaugurated a debate on the 
legitimacy of judicial review, one that can fairly be said to have consumed 
Canadian constitutional theory and adjudication since that time.  Of 
course, theoretical debates inquiring into the legitimacy of judicial review 
are in no way unique to Canada, serving as they have as a mainstay of 
constitutional theory in many jurisdictions.  But the Canadian 
instantiation of these debates has certain unique contours and an 
intriguing history.  After the introduction of the Charter, critics quickly 
emerged from the left, arguing that Courts lacked the legitimacy and 
competence to decide serious social policy questions.24  These voices were 
matched and paralleled by commentators on the right who complained of 
“judicial activism” and the lack of judicial accountability.25  Over time, the 
response to these critiques from those supporting the Charter took shape 
in a dialogic theory of judicial review, arguing that the judiciary’s role was 
simply as one partner in a conversation about the meaning and 
application of the Charter, effectively defending judicial review by 
diminishing the sense of its finality.  Debates over “dialogue theory” came 
not only to preoccupy (to the point of exhaustion, many would say) 
constitutional theory26 but were eventually seized upon by the Supreme 
Court of Canada itself as an account of the legitimacy of its role.27  
Constitutionalism in Canada since 1982 has been shot through with 
contestation regarding the role and legitimacy of judicial review in the 
constitutional order.  
 One way of reading this fact of Canadian constitutionalism is 
simply as a democratic worry of the kind hashed about in the United 
States since the early 19th century,28 delayed in its Canadian appearance 
owing to the late introduction of a constitutional bill of rights.  On this 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
24 See e.g. ANDREW J. PETTER, The Politics of the Charter, 8 The Supreme Court Law Review 
473,  (1986).; ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON & ANDREW PETTER, Private Rights-Public Wrongs: The 
Liberal Lie of the Charter, 38 UTLJ 278,  (1988). 
25 See e.g. F. L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, The Charter revolution and the Court Party   
(Broadview Press. 2000). 
26 See e.g. PETER W. HOGG & ALLISON A. BUSHELL, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or perhaps the Charter of Rights isn't such a bad thing after all), 35 Osgoode Hall 
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Dialogue   (Irwin Law. 2001). 
27 See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at paras. 137-140; R v Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at 
paras. 20, 57; Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519.  
28 The literature on this topic is, of course, enormous.  See e.g. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, The Least 
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics   (Yale University Press 2nd ed. 
1986).; PAUL W. KAHN, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America   
(Yale University Press. 1997). 
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reading, the story is essentially one about the democratic accountability of 
the judiciary.  This is certainly part of the story in Canada and I do not 
suggest that this is a misreading.  My argument, however, is that there is 
much more at play in this debate in Canada and that at its core is a tension 
between fundamental ways of imagining the role and function of a 
constitution, a tension made palpable and pronounced by the 
particularities of Canadian constitutional history and reflective of 
important dimensions of constitutional culture.   
 The dominant experience over constitutional history in Canada has 
been of a constitution as compact and political compromise.  This is what I 
have called the consummately political constitution.  Since confederation 
in 1867 until 1982 the role of the courts in constitutional matters was one 
of sustaining the political.  When they spoke in a constitutional idiom, the 
voice of the courts was not interpreting the governing truths of a 
constitutional text but, rather, using the constitution as a device in 
arbitrating as between political powers within the state.  The courts were 
curating the political compact of confederation in a manner that left 
substantive matters to legislative will.  When it spoke on constitutional 
matters, the Supreme Court of Canada was normally attempting to strike 
a balance as between provincial and federal legislative bodies, interpreting 
and applying the political bargain struck among provinces in the 
formation of the country.  Substantive matters were left to political 
institutions with the courts umpiring the contest when the two sides 
wrestled over jurisdiction.   
 The animating principle in this era of constitutionalism in Canada 
was that of the classic British constitution: parliamentary supremacy.  The 
ethos of parliamentary supremacy elevates political will and interest.  If a 
legislative act can be imagined, parliamentary supremacy in the Canadian 
federation begins with the proposition that one level of government or the 
other has the power to enact it.29  There was a role for the courts in 
constitutional matters – an important one – but it was a role in “arbitrating 
will”.  The courts were tasked with maintaining a workable, balanced 
political compact within which interest and political preference remained 
supreme.  One can see clearly the way in which this historic role for the 
courts matches the logic of the particular, as I have described it.  On this 
logic, the Constitution is first and foremost about practical solutions to 
local problems of governance among multiple political communities.  
Judicial review was not a new issue with the Charter; courts suspended 
and declared invalid legislation for over a century before the Charter was 
instituted and yet Canadian constitutional theory did not bother much 
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with the democratic legitimacy of judicial review.  We were comfortable 
with judicial review because it was about curating the political, which, 
consistent with the logic of a consummately political constitution, 
remained responsible for substantive policy matters.  For the first 115 
years of Canadian constitutional history this is the principal role that 
courts played in Canadian constitutionalism. 
 One still finds this mode of constitutionalism, with its political and 
particular core, in modern federalism decisions.  Yet perhaps the best 
expression of this constitutional logic from within the Supreme Court’s 
own jurisprudence is found in the Reference re Secession of Quebec.30  The 
question of whether Quebec could secede unilaterally from Canada was 
referred to the Supreme Court of Canada.  This is the Ur-case of the courts 
curating the constitutional compact, tending to the local particulars of 
Canadian state history.  The Court approached this question by 
articulating the foundational principles that animate the Canadian 
constitutional order (it named federalism, democracy, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, and respect for minorities), setting the terrain on 
which political action would have to take place.  The Court looked to 
Canadian history to catalogue the political conventions that form part of 
Canadian constitutionalism and ultimately held that political recognition 
and negotiation would be constitutionally required should a clear 
majority of Quebecers express the will to secede from Canada.  In 
summarizing its role, the Court offered a passage that is perfectly 
emblematic of the first logic of constitutionalism – the logic of the 
particular, the local, and the political: 
 
The task of the Court has been to clarify the legal framework 
within which political decisions are to be taken "under the 
Constitution", not to usurp the prerogatives of the political 
forces that operate within that framework.  The obligations 
we have identified are binding obligations under the 
Constitution of Canada. However, it will be for the political 
actors to determine what constitutes "a clear majority on a 
clear question" in the circumstances under which a future 
referendum vote may be taken.  Equally, in the event of 
demonstrated majority support for Quebec secession, the 
content and process of the negotiations will be for the 
political actors to settle.  The reconciliation of the various 
legitimate constitutional interests is necessarily committed to 
the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because 
that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give 
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and take of political negotiations.  To the extent issues 
addressed in the course of negotiation are political, the 
courts, appreciating their proper role in the constitutional 
scheme, would have no supervisory role.31 
 
This is the Court acting in execution of consummately constitutional 
duties but there is nothing universal, nothing based in general claims of 
right or reason, and everything contingent, local, and particular about its 
role.  To be sure, in its decision the Court also reflected the Canadian 
constitutional commitment to broader norms, such as the protection of 
minorities.  Again, these logics are not pure forms but, rather, pull on one 
another at all points.  But the heart of the decision is deference to will 
rather than the assertion of universal claims of reason or right.  It is the 
Court guiding procedurally while deferring substantively to the 
exigencies and force of political will.  This is a judicial role consonant with 
one, venerable, logic of constitutionalism. 
 It is trite to observe that the Constitution Act, 1982, and the Charter 
in particular, radically altered the role of the courts.  More telling is the 
shift in constitutional logic that this change in role reflected.  Rather than 
curating or sustaining the political, the Court’s voice in constitutional 
matters would now involve limiting or containing the political.  In its new 
role enforcing rights, the judiciary would now speak substantive truth in 
response to interest and will.  The universals of rights and categorical 
claims of just state-citizen relations could and would now hollow out a 
space in the antecedent sphere of parliamentary (read political) supremacy 
into which no expression of will, no manifestation of political interest, 
could encroach.  This is a familiar logic to U.S. constitutional theory, that 
of courts as guardians of substantive limits on the political – the high 
priests of constitutionalism; but it was a fundamental shift in 
constitutional life in Canada.   
 With this shift, the ultimate word on substantive matters of policy 
would be spoken by courts in the idiom of rights and proportional 
limitations on rights.  Means-ends proportionality is none other than the 
deployment of reason as a limit on political will.32  Canadian courts were 
thus placed in the position of oracles of reason-based universals and, in 
this way, became part of a global conversation of constitutional courts. 
The universalist nature of rights discourse implies a convergence in 
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method and reason, one that we have seen coalescing among 
contemporary Supreme Courts around the world.  Met with an issue that 
turns on fundamental political or social rights, the tools, reasoning, and 
considerations ought not to differ much whether spoken by the Canadian, 
South African, or Israeli supreme courts or, for that matter, by the 
European Court of Justice or the UN Committee on Human Rights.  
Positions might differ but the language would be highly recognizable, 
maybe even portable.  The introduction of the Charter was a rebalancing 
between political will as the expression of particular interest and reason as 
the universal logic of rights; the new role for the courts reflected this shift 
in constitutional logics.   
 There is no shortage of Charter cases that displays the judicial role 
incumbent on this second logic of constitutionalism.  A sterling example is 
the Court’s unanimous decision in United States v Burns and Rafay.33  The 
question before the Court was whether it was constitutionally permissible 
to extradite two accused to Washington State to face three counts of 
aggravated first degree murder, where the potential penalties included 
capital punishment.  The practice of capital punishment was abolished in 
Canada by act of Parliament in 1976, after years of political debate.  The 
question in Burns and Rafay was, essentially, whether the Charter 
prohibited the Canadian government from exposing a citizen to capital 
punishment at all.  The Court concluded that it would offend s. 7’s 
guarantee of life, liberty and security of the person and offend the 
principles of fundamental justice to extradite without assurances that the 
death penalty would not be sought.  In deciding this politically pregnant 
question, filled with issues of executive power and international relations, 
at every turn the Court’s reasoning sounds in the register of 
constitutionalism as an expression of universal rights as limits on the 
political and on executive power.  In its reasoning the Court invokes the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, various protocols under 
that covenant, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, various U.N. 
releases and reports, and European protocols, conventions, and court 
rulings as persuasive authority on the rights-offending nature of capital 
punishment.  There is no sense of deference to the political process as the 
matter is cast entirely as one of fundamental and universal rights, albeit 
anchored in a Canadian context.  Consistent with the underlying logic of 
rights-based constitutionalism, with some local colour and legislative 
specifics extracted, the decision could have as easily been issued by the 
German Constitutional Court as by the Canadian Supreme Court.  Now a 
Charter issue, the Court has the constitutional role and authority to 
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conclusively settle a substantive question that was, prior to 1982, a matter 
determined exclusively by political will.  
 Contrasting the Secession Reference with Burns and Rafay draws into 
sharp focus my point that the nature of judicial review displays the extent 
to which Canadians are children of two constitutional logics.  Read in this 
way, the pitched debate regarding judicial review is, amongst other 
things, an expression of the felt tension between a new sense of 
constitutionalism and an older way of thinking about the nature and 
function of constitutions.  Indeed, the charge of judicial activism – a potent 
cry in Canada leveled equally by critical scholars on the left and 
conservatives on the right – can be heard as anxiety that the first 
constitutional logic is being eclipsed by the second.  At core, we see in the 
Canadian practices of and debates about judicial review a contest of 
constitutional logics – one of managing political arrangements and finding 
working solutions among interests and another about declaring universal 
truth as found in rights and reason.  Canadian constitutional life can’t let 
go of a tradition in which judicial review fundamentally served the 
political, nor can it now turn its back on a newer role in which the courts 
honour the constitution by trumping interest with rights, will with reason, 
and the particular with the universal.  This tension beats at the heart of 
constitutional life in Canada… but why? 
 Of course, debates about the legitimacy of judicial review are found 
in constitutional systems around the world.  Judicial review raises basic 
democratic questions, such as the legitimacy of an unelected judiciary 
and, more at a deeper and more interesting level, the problem of a 
community governing itself over time.34  Yet despite the overwhelming 
influence of U.S. and international theory in Canadian debates on the 
legitimacy of judicial review, it is a mistake to reduce the anxiety about 
this issue in Canada to a shared concern with these structural issues.  
Scholars who draw easy equivalencies between the US and Canadian 
debates miss something important about Canadian constitutional culture.  
When we ask why this appearance of concern about the political and the 
particular continues to have such purchase in Canada despite the 
existence of an entrenched bill of rights, why the universal has not 
eclipsed the older logic of constitutionalism, the answer comes back to key 
narratives about Canadian constitutional identity.  The British tradition, in 
which parliamentary supremacy is the particular expression of the 
priority of political will, is a deep part of constitutional self-understanding 
in Canada.  It must be recalled that Canada is an anti-revolutionary 
constitutional culture, in some ways no less shaped by the American 
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Revolution than its neighbor to the south.  The preponderance of English 
inhabitants of what would become Canada were loyalists committed to 
the continuance of the British tradition in North America.  The defeat of 
the Americans in the War of 1812 was the defence of political autonomy 
under this way of life, this form of governance.  There is, thus, a deep way 
in which the claim about a kind of “Americanization” that comes with 
judicial review interacts with the narratives that help to shape Canadian 
political and constitutional identity.   
But there is another narrative layer that helps to explain the 
distinctive purchase of the logic of the particular and, hence, the depth of 
anxiety around questions of judicial review.  Over time, the British 
parliamentary tradition took on a particular inflection in Canada, 
becoming associated with the rise of social welfare.  For much of Canadian 
history the most symbolically prized advances in social justice in Canada 
came through the legislatures, not the courts.  Brown v. Board of Education 
was decided in 1954.  The first iteration of national, universal healthcare 
was introduced by act of Parliament in 1957,35 building on earlier 
provincial legislative innovations.  What is often overlooked in 
discussions of the Canadian instantiation of the debate about judicial 
review is the way in which the parliamentary tradition has been 
imaginatively tethered to Canadian self-understanding as a social 
democracy committed to some version of a welfare state.  This link 
between contests about judicial review and the social democratic identity 
of the country explains some of the deeper elements of the public 
controversy – the trauma – that occurred when the supreme court used 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to invalidate a key aspect of the public 
health care scheme in Quebec.36  This decision was not just an occasion for 
concern about the democratic nature of judicial review, but a site of overt 
conflict between two logics of constitutionalism, and a point at which the 
logic of the particular touched upon a key dimension of “who we are”.   
Limits on judicial review are limits that the particular imposes on 
the logic of the universal.  Structurally, these limits are points at which 
constitutional culture privileges will over reason.  In Canada, debates over 
these limits are also entwined with stories that shape constitutional 
identity and point to important dimensions of constitutional culture.  This 
is yet another place where one finds that identifying points of tension 
between the two logics of constitutionalism is a way into Canadian 
constitutional culture.   
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 There is no shortage of historical injustices perpetrated by the state 
in Canadian history.  From the Chinese head tax,37 to the internment of 
Japanese in the second world war, the denial of asylum to Jews fleeing 
Europe in the shadow of the Shoah, or the history of eugenics and forced 
sterilization of the mentally handicapped, Canadian governments have, 
like other nations, visited significant suffering on its peoples over the life 
of the country.  These injustices mar Canadian history and have been 
attended to by means of political settlement, official inquiry, apology and 
sometimes reparation.  Shameful and harrowing as they have been, these 
dark acts of the state have not generally been read in Canadian political 
life as undermining the authority of the state or engaging questions of 
fundamental constitutional moment. 
 The history of the treatment of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada – 
also a story of historical injustice and the exercise of raw economic, 
physical, and political power over a minority population – sounds in a 
different register altogether.  The presence and immediacy of this issue is 
palpable to a visitor to Canada, who is reminded in a variety of ways of 
the underlying and durable claim to sovereignty made by the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada.  One cannot appreciate modern Canadian 
constitutional life absent a grasp of the unique role played by issues of 
Aboriginal justice including, most prominently, constitutional claims of 
Aboriginal rights and title over land.  The constitutional debate 
surrounding these issues of Aboriginal rights and title cannot be 
understood without seeing the way in which they are shaped by the 
tension that I have been describing in this piece – the tension arising from 
the fact that Canadians have now inherited two distinct, and sometimes 
competing, but both still salient constitutional logics.  
 Issues of Aboriginal justice are dealt with in Canada through 
doctrines and devices that overtly seek to reopen the era of compacts and 
compromises that constituted the community.  Alongside the English and 
French, Aboriginal peoples played a crucial role in the creation of the 
country yet they were unrecognized in the Constitution Act, 1867 (other 
than as a subject matter of Federal jurisdiction).38  Modern advocacy and 
jurisprudence on Aboriginal justice issues has thus been built either on 
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recovering the originary compromise and political promises made in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 in which the Crown vouchsafed lands and 
rights to the Indigenous peoples of Canada39 or, where they existed, the 
treaties – the literal compacts – reached between the Crown and First 
Nations in the early formation of Canada.  Treaty litigation activates the 
older logic of constitutionalism, seeking to honour arrangements precisely 
designed to establish harmonious relations amongst peoples and political 
arrangements responsive to life for these people, in this place.  That these 
treaties and proclamations have not been honoured historically does not 
forfeit them their constitutional status.   
 Patriation of the Constitution in 1982 virtually codified this 
assignation of Aboriginal justice issues to the realm of politics and will, 
rather than universal reason.  Sections 1 to 34 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
comprise the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The next section, section 35, is 
part of this same Constitution Act but falls outside Canada’s constitutional 
bill of rights.  It states, simply, that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.”  The Supreme Court of Canada has recently described “the 
grand purpose of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” as facilitating “[t]he 
reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a mutually 
respectful long-term relationship”.40  Furthermore, in a textual echo of the 
principle discussed earlier in this piece that one part of the Constitution 
cannot be used to attack another – a principle that recognizes the existence 
and continued salience of two constitutional logics – s. 25(1) of the Charter 
itself explicitly states as follows: 
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or 
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or 
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
including 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
39 HAMAR FOSTER & BENJAMIN L. BERGER, From Humble Prayers to Legal Demands: The 
Cowichan Petition of 1909 and the British Columbia Indian Land Question, in History's Living 
Legacy: Essays on Colonial Legal Culture in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, (Hamar Foster, 
et al. eds., 2008). 
40 Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3. S.C.R. 103 at para. 10.  See R. v 
Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 73, in which the Court describes the purpose of s. 35(1) as 
being “to reconcile the existence of distinctive aboriginal societies prior to the arrival of 
Europeans in North America with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over that territory”.  See 
also Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 
at para 1: “The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the 
reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, 
interests, and ambitions.”  
% *%20%*%
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the 
Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and 
(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada by way of land claims 
settlement. 
 
This section is saying that the new universalist logic of constitutionalism 
cannot be used to limit or restrain the effort to repair and redeem the old.   
 Consistent with the ascription of Aboriginal justice to the logic of 
this first constitutionalism, and connecting back to the prior section on 
judicial review, the dominant theme in the Court’s management of s. 35 
and treaty rights – its mode of judicial review – is consistently (perhaps to 
a fault) the assertion of political and relational obligations such as the duty 
to consult, the “honour of the Crown”, and the political duties incumbent 
on the project of redeeming the gaps and broken promises in Canada’s 
originary compact.41  The Court is clear that s. 35’s promise “is realized 
and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of honourable 
negotiation”.42 In Delgamuukw v British Columbia, the watershed case on 
Aboriginal rights and title in Canada, Chief Justice Lamer famously 
concluded his judgment with a paragraph that well reflects the 
assignation of these issues to constitutionalism of managing political 
communities: 
 
…this litigation has been both long and expensive, not only 
in economic but in human terms as well. By ordering a new 
trial, I do not necessarily encourage the parties to proceed to 
litigation and to settle their dispute through the courts. As 
was said in Sparrow, at p. 1105, s. 35(1) "provides a solid 
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can 
take place". Those negotiations should also include other 
aboriginal nations which have a stake in the territory 
claimed. Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a 
legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in 
good faith. Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, 
with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced by 
the judgments of this Court, that we will achieve what I 
stated in Van der Peet, supra, at para. 31, to be a basic 
purpose of s. 35(1) -- "the reconciliation of the pre-existence 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
41 See, esp., Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para. 
25; R. v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
42 Haida, ibid at para. 25. 
% *%21%*%
of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown". 
Let us face it, we are all here to stay. 
 
The courts retain the authority to declare Aboriginal rights and title but 
they are slow to do so, preferring to push the issue back into the domain 
of interest and the negotiation between sovereign wills.  The courts thus 
assume their role within the older constitutional logic – to sustain and 
curate the domain of the political.   
One could well imagine that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
would have something to say about the inequalities, poverty, health crises, 
systemic marginalization, and historical injustice that characterizes the 
predicament of many Canadian Aboriginal communities.  Such issues 
might be addressed through the equality guarantee found in s. 15(1) of the 
Charter or the protection of life, liberty, and security of the person found in 
s. 7.  The protection of customs, rituals, and sacred could perhaps be 
addressed by the guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience43 with 
traditional community structure and governance perhaps dealt with 
through associational rights.  To do so would seem not only logical and 
direct but also a vindication and strong affirmation of the general social 
and political values of the Canadian community.  Indeed, this is the way 
in which most contemporary claims of discrimination, state-inflicted 
injustice, and inequality are analyzed in modern Canadian 
constitutionalism.  So, again, we are met with the question as to why this 
issue remains durably assigned to the logic of the particular in Canada, 
why this particular is not consumed by the advancing logic of the 
universal. 
 To be sure, certain Aboriginal justice claims, such as those to title 
over land, do not seem particularly well suited to the Charter.  But that’s 
an incomplete answer.  The interesting point is that the many claims that 
do seem suited to Charter resolution are seldom addressed in this manner.  
In the few cases in which substantive equality as guaranteed by s. 15(1) is 
invoked to address the systemic exclusion and need for unique treatment 
of Aboriginal communities, or freedom of religion is invoked to protect 
historical practice and sacred places, the results are often unsatisfying and 
the experience is strangely awkward for Canadian law. 
 The problem is that Aboriginal justice is simply not understood, at 
base, as a question of the rights and protections to which we are all 
entitled as a matter of human dignity.  Within the Canadian constitutional 
imagination there is something intuitively inappropriate about addressing 
Aboriginal justice with rights enjoyed by all because the failure at the 
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heart of Aboriginal justice claims was not and is not a failure of the 
universal and common; it is, rather a failure of our political constitution 
(in all senses of the word) and this must be spoken to with the older logic 
of constitutionalism as community formation, compact, will, and 
compromise.  The justice issues that arise from the historical treatment of 
the Indigenous peoples of Canada are issues that touch upon the identity 
of the nation, stitched into the narratives of the country.   
It is tempting to argue that efforts to address Aboriginal justice 
issues flow from the internalization of a new story about Canadian 
identity, one in which the country was founded by multiple nations and 
legal traditions, including not only the two dominant European traditions 
but also the cultures of those who inhabited the land before “discovery.”44  
More likely, I suspect, is that Canadian constitutional identity has 
internalized a story about its intrinsically colonial nature and the violence 
and victimization at the heart of its political formation.  On either account, 
though, the issue of Aboriginal justice persists as a matter for the 
particular, ill-fitted to the logic of the universal, because it is somehow 
fundamental to narratives that shape the identity of the Canadian 
constitutional state.  The Canadian understanding of the historical 
injustice suffered by Aboriginal peoples is not as a failure of regard for 
what we are all and everywhere owed as human beings but, rather, an 
injustice that cannot be abstracted from either this place or who we are.  
To address such matters in the idiom of universal rights is a Canadian 
constitutional category error.  The treatment of Aboriginal justice issues is 
thus another expression of the palpable way in which Canadians remain 
children of two constitutional logics, another instance of the line of insight 
into constitutional culture that we gain by looking at those points at which 
the logic of the particular resists the claims of universality and reason 
alone.   
 
Conclusion – Understanding Constitutional Cultures 
 
 This paper has been concerned with exposing something of the 
architecture of Canadian constitutional culture, displaying a structural 
tension within the idea of constitutionalism in Canada.  What has been 
revealed is not an incompatibility, nor a problem or inconsistency that 
calls for resolution.  It is, instead, a complexity in the imaginative 
inheritance that forms part of contemporary Canadian culture.  Exposed, 
it shines a light on the distinctive aspects of Canadian constitutional life.  
Canadians live as the children of two constitutional logics.  One is the 
political constitution, that which attends to the particular, the local, and 
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concerns itself with sovereignty and will.  The other is the constitution of 
liberal political culture, the expression of general principles of good 
governance, claims based in universal right, and the privileging of reason.  
Seeking to understand any significant dimension of Canadian 
constitutional life, one must contend, I have argued, with the reality of 
negotiating these two constitutional logics.  This is true of the 
management and encounter with diversity or the issue of 
multiculturalism; the status and nature of judicial review; or the purchase 
and prominence of Aboriginal justice issues.  But the reach of this insight 
is greater, inflecting not only domestic issues such as the modern 
treatment of Canada’s symbolically precious health care system, but also 
arguably shows its face in broader comparative registers, such as 
Canada’s legal and political relationship to international law and its 
complicated place situated between constitutional trends in Europe and 
the U.S. tradition.   
 The tension between these two ideas of what a constitution does – 
this tension between a constitutional logic of the particular and one of the 
universal – may be not just the predicament of contemporary Canadian 
constitutionalism but, sometimes sotto voce, of modern constitutionalism at 
large.  The constitution as both republican and liberal shows its face in 
French and U.S. constitutional culture, though the expression of this 
tension would require separate study, its own constitutional 
ethnography.45  The same could be said with respect to a very different 
historical unfolding in U.K. constitutionalism, which in recent years has 
been as concerned with the project of European bureaucratic 
constitutionalism as with devolution in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  It 
is perhaps when we are now faced with questions of constitutional 
creation that this contest of logics becomes clearest.  We know that a new 
constitution in Iraq must respond to the political realities and fraught 
histories of Sunni, Shiia, and Kurdish communities, and, further, that 
Islamic law must figure meaningfully into this new constitution, but we 
intuit, quite rightly, that universal norms, and the way of thinking about 
government that such norms reflect, will have little to contribute on this 
point.  Yet this new constitution must also be the expression of universal 
human rights and liberal democratic principles.  The resulting constitution 
is complex, awkward, and fraught with tensions.  These are tensions that 
one sees in all new constitutions, from Afghanistan and the manic 
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constitution making in Thailand,46 to Egypt’s past and future 
constitutions. 
The Canadian experience, with its long constitutional history only 
latterly injected with a strong rights-protecting tradition, expresses this 
confluence of constitutional logics particularly well.  But wrestling with 
the universal and the particular as equally precious but awkwardly 
combined expressions of what constitutionalism is about may be a 
modern conundrum of liberal constitutionalism at a time when national 
histories still matter deeply and the idea of national sovereignty is not yet 
obsolete.  These tensions are the predicament of modern 
constitutionalism.  Expressed differently in different contexts, perhaps 
today we are all children of two constitutional logics.  If this is so, then the 
study of comparative constitutional cultures should be keenly interested 
in those points in the constitutional life of a country at which the claims of 
the particular persist in spite of the logic of the universal – those issues 
that occupy such a key place in the constitutional imagination of the 
community that they cannot be recast in or reduced to universalist terms, 
cannot be made subject to the claims of reason alone.  These points of 
particularity are windows onto constituting narratives.  They are orienting 
points for a constitutional culture precisely because they are other than 
that which we could all share as common participants in a universalist 
logic of reasonable government.  Perhaps this link between the particular 
and constitutional culture that I have drawn out in this paper is natural 
enough – identity always turns on the particular.  And for the political, as 
in the personal, it is the particular – not the universal – that defines 
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